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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ZELLA GYGI, as Administratrix
of the Esta:te of DAVID ALAN GYGI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
LOIS STORCH and THE TRA VELERS INSURANCE COMP ANY,
a corporation,
Def endants-Responde%ts.

Case No.

12834

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant claims that the respondent, Lois
Storch, maliciously, knowingly and intentionally subjected the appellant's son, David Alan Gygi, to such
mental and emotional anguish that Mr. Gygi took his
own life. Appellant contends that such actions by the
respondent are actionable and should be proscribed as
violative of public policy. Respondent denies improper
conducit with relation to Mr. Gygi and claims she is
entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the
life of Mr. Gygi inasmuch as she was named the beneficiary.

DISPOSITION OF 'rHE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court, J nclge .J a.mes S. Sa,wa!·a, granteu
respondent Lois Storch's Motion for Summarv• ,Ju<}rr0
ment finding that there existed no g0nuine i::;snp of faet
or law and ordered the insurance proceeds from a lif1
in::;urance policy to be paid by respondent, The
Insurance Company, to respondent, Lois Storeli, and
that appellant's complaint be dismissPd with JH'PjnJice
(R. 100)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant contends that the Lower Court erred in
granting respondent Lois Storch's Motion for Smnrnan
Judgment. There were sufficient rnatPrial facts upon
which reasonable minds may differ to vvarrant a denial
of respondent's motion and therefore the aforesai<l
Summary Judgment should be set aside anJ the action
should be remanded to the Lower Court for a trial on
the merits.

STATEMENT OJ<' FACTS
The defendant, Lois Storch, a divorced woman haYing custody of five minor children first met one DaYid
Alan Gygi in November, 1970. The def enclant at tht
time she met Mr. Gygi was approximately thirty-seven
years old and Mr. Gygi was approximately twenty-sewn.
The defendant had just been granted a decree of divorce
from a very unhappy marriage in January, 1970.
deposition of Lois Storch, P. 5-7). A relationship dt·
veloped between the defendant and Mr. Gygi fr'O'n tht
.2

tirne of their first meeting until the untimely death of
Mr. Gygi on July 5, 1971, whereon he took his life with
Jiis <Ywn hand.
In March of 1971 .Mr. Gygi secured through his
employer Group Life Insurance with defendant, The
'l'ravelers Insurance Company, as the insurer. There
was no designated beneficiary listed at the time Mr.
Gygi made application for the insurance, however subsequently the defendant, Lois Storch, was listed as the
Leneficiary under the description of "friend."
The defendant, Lois Storch, has made a claim for
the insurance proceeds and the Adminitratrix of the
Es(ate of David Alan Gygi, his mother, Mrs. Zella Gygi,
also made a claim. The defendant, The Travelers Insurance Comany, has tendered to the court the proceeds
of the life insurance policy.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
INASMUCH AS THERE EXISTED SUFFICIENT
DISPUTED FACTS UPON WHICH REASONABLE
MINDS · COULD · DIFFER-- AND UPON WHICH
JUDGMENT FOR THE APPELLANT COULD BE
FOUNDED.

There has been over the past decade an everincreasing recognition of the so called "right" to emotional or mental tranquillity. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recently expanded .this "right" in sevPral "right of privacy" decisions. The growth of this
particular phase of jurisprudence has been slow. (See
.3

Magruder, Calvert, ".Mental anJ Emotional Dis:lurLance
in the Law of Torts,'' 49 Harvard L. Rev. p. 1058.) No
longer does tht> law of torts hold religiously to tlie
precept that redress can only be found where 80111 ,o
physical damage has been purpetrated.
"Under r.iretm1stances considered in snhs<'qt1P11t
sections, a limited recognition has lwen aeronled
by law to the interest in mental or emotional
tranquility, and in some eanses the right to main
tain an action has been regarded as permissible,
although the only actual harm or damage snffered consisted of a mental or emotional distnrbance, unconnected with any bodily injury to the
plaintiff." 52 Am.Jur. "Torts"
A close look at the dynamics of the law of torts will
reveal the necessity for growth brought about by the
automobile. With mounting economic and sociological
problems incurred by increased motor vehicular transportation there was a need for protection under the law
of torts. The need for protection produced the negligence, contributory negligence, last clear chance, guest
or passenger, and unavoidable accident theories of tort
law.
Today our institutions are over crowded with individual who suffer some mental or emotional problems.
The loss of human resources is overwhelming, not to
mention the tremendous economic burden incurred as a
result of the growing mental instability of our society.
Naturally not all of these problems are a result of direct
inter-relationship of one being with another. Many prob-
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Je1rn; are social or environmental in scope and social
refonn through its proper method is a continuing proWhy then has the law been so slow ito afford
protection where one person by his actions causes another
to suffer severe emotional or mental distress'?
In the Third Cause of Action in Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint the plaintiff sets forth facts suffieient to bring the plaintiff within this ever expanding
recognition of one's right to emotional and mental tranquility. 'l'his cause of action should .not have be.en dismissed.
The compilers of the Restatement of Torts 2d in
Section 46 set out the general pattern for development
in this area of law:

Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotion Distress

"(l) One who bY the extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally
reckiessly carnies severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress, ·and: if bodily harm
to the other results from it,
such bodily harm.
"(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third
person, the actor is subject to liability if he
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress.
·

·or:

for

" (a) to a member of such person's immediate
family who is present at the· time, whether
or not such distress results in boqily harm,
or
"(b) to any other person who is present at
the time, if such distress results in bodily
harm."

The editors of Caveat and Conmwnts indicate tJi1
perpk,xing sta:te of this facet of tort law. II owewr it is
generalfy concluded that "Pxtreme and outrageomi con.
dnct" that directly resnlts in <'motional or mPntal disheis
is actionahle at law.
"Caveat:
"The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether
there may not be other circumstances under which
the actor may be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distres1.
''Comment:
"a. This Section is concerned onlv with emotional
distress which is inflicted in ten tionallY or recklessly. As to the negligent infliction of. emotional
distress, see §§ 312, 313, 436, and 436A.
"b. As indicated in Chapter 47, emotional distress
may be an element of damages in many cases
where other interests have been invaded, an1 tort
liability has arisen apart from the emotional distress. Because of the fear of fictitious or trivial
claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the difficulty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries
to liability, the law has been slow to afford independent protection to the interest in freedom from
emotional distress standing alone. It is only
within recent years that the rule stated in
Section has been fully recognized as a separatP
and distinct basis of tort liability, without the
presence of the elements necesi:iary to any other
tort, such as assault, battery, false imprisonment,
trespass to land, or the like. This Section may lw
regarded as an extension of the principle involved
in the rules stated in §§21-3± as to the tort of
assault.

"c. The law is still in a stage of development,
and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet
determined. This Section states the extent of the
liability thus far accepted generally by the courts.
'rhe Caveat is intended to leave fully open the
possibility of further development of the law, and
the recognition of other situations in which liability may be imposed.
"d. Extreme and outrageous conduct. The cases
thus far decided have found liability only where
the defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. H has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortiorn;
or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has
been characterized by 'malice,' ot a · degree of
aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort. Liability has
been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree,
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
an<l to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolrrable in a civilizrd community. Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to
an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead
him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'

''The liahility clearlv does not exfend to mere
insults, indignitiPs, ·threats, annoyances,
oppressions, or other trivialities. The rough edges
of our :-;o('ietY an• still in need of a g-ood deal of
in the meanfone plaintiffs must
filing down,
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough langua.ge, and
to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate
and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to
:7

intervene in every case where some one's
are hurt. There must still be freedom to expres<
an unflatering opinion, and some safety vah 1,
must be left through which irascible tempers ma1
blow off relatively harmless steam. See
gruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts, 47 Harvard Law ReYiew 1033,
1053 ( 1936). It is only where there is a special
relation between the parties, as stated in
that there may be recovery for insults not amount
ing to extreme outrage."
Sections 312 and 313 delve into the less demanding
areas of the tort law where emotional distress is action
able where "intended" or "unintended." The latter is a
theory based upon conventional negligence theory.

"§312. Emotional Distress Intended
"If the actor intentionallv and unreasonablv subjects another to emotional distress which he
,
recognize as likely to result in illness or other '
bodily harm, he is subject to liability to the other
for an illness or other bodily harm of which
distress is a legal. cause,
"(a) although the actor has no intention of in·
flicting such harm, and
"(b) irrespective of whether the act is directetl
against the other or a third person.
"Comment:

,

"a. The rule stated in this Section does not gil'e
protection to mental and emotional tranquility in
itself. In general, as stated in §43GA, there is
no liability where the actor's conduct inflicts onl 1
emotional distress, without resulting bodil:-' harm
:Ql: ·any other invasion of the other's in
:8

'l'he emotional disturbance is important only in
so far as its existence involves a risk of bodily
harm, and as affecting the damages which may
be recovered if the bodily harm is sustained.
8ee §905.
''b. '1 here is a eonsiderable degree of duplica:tion
between the rule stated in this SE,ction and that
statf. . d in §46, which deals with the intentional or
recklt>ss infliction of emotional distress bv extn·mP and outrageons conduct. In most o.f the
cases in ·which tlw intentional infliction of
tional distress results in foreseeable bodily harm,
the known risk of such bodily harm is sufficient
in itself to make the act one of extreme outrage
and to bring the case within §46. This is true,
for example, where the actor screams threats and
violent abuse at a person whom he knows to be
at death's door with a weak heart. The action
may be maintained, a11d the damages for -the
bodily harm may be recovered, on the basis of
the intentional tort. (See §46, Corrunent j.) This
Section permits the alternative of a negligence
action in such a case. The rnle stated hL c 's tends, however, somewhat further than frs : >:
of
It permits the negligence action in Uh.'
case where it may be found that the condi.1ct,
although intended to inflict emotional distress,
amounts to something less than extreme outrage,
but nevertheless involves an unreasonable risk,
which the actor should recognize, that bodily harm
will result. .As stated in
there may be a
similar liabilitv where the emotional disturbance
is not inflicted intentionally, but negligently."
1

"§313. Emotional Distress Unintended
"(1) If the actor unintentionally causes emotional

distress to another, he is subject to liability to
9

the other for resulting illness or hodil v ham1 if ·
the actor
·
·
'' (a) should have realized that his conduet in
volved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the hann
or peril of a third person, and

1

"(b) from facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it
caused, might
result in illness or bodily harm.
The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no
application to illness or bodily harm of anotlm
which is caused by emotionitl distress arising
solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless
the negligence of the actor has othenvise created
an unreasonable risk of bodily hann to the other."

''(2)

Plaintiff's third cause of action claims tha:t the defendant, Lois Storch, knowingly and with malice inflicted
emotional distress upon Mr. Gygi to the extent that
her actions resulted in Mr. Gygi's death. Certainly there
are sufficient facts upon which men might differ in
to the actions of the defendant; whether such
are legally actionable.

1. The defendant knew the errwtional instability of
Mr. Gygi at a very early state in her relationship 'rith
him.
2. The defendant knew that Mr. U-ygi was deep!)'
in love with her and spent many hours discussing marriage with him. (See deposition of Lois Storch, P. 2i)
Defendant admits that she was aware of Mr. Gvgi'o
l'O

1

romplete infatuation even to the point where, "'I knew
I could take advantage if I wanted to."
3. :Mr. Gygi's deep love for the defendant was recognized as such by them in the early Spring of 1971. (See
deposition of Janet Ride·r, P. 20) Knowing of Mr. Gygi's
most secret intentions, the defendant continued to encourage the deceased to repose in her trust and confidence.
4. On July 5, 1971, the defendant, having encouraged
a serious relationship with Mr. Gygi for more than
8 months in which they were together about three or fom
times per ·week (Ree depostion of Janet Rider, P. 16)
:rnddenly and with knowledge of probable consequences
told Mr. Gygi that she had no intention of marrying him
and now desired to completely terminate the relationship. (See deposition of Lois Storch, P. 39)

CONCLUSION
It i:o difficult fo establish a policy of law in the
area of emotional and mental distress as is evident from
a reading of the Restatement of Torts 2nd. Howeve·r
the editors of that work and many courts in this country
have been motivated to set forth some protection from
conduct that is extreme in nature. Where that line dividing exfreme conduct from other forms of condnct exists
is highly problematical. ·we WOLild conte11d th, i 1 1d1:
tlt2 circnmsbrnces as set forth hel'ein the conduct and
actions of respondent, Lois Storch, shodd be cc:. ·
as highly detrimental to society and in violation of pnblic
policy.
11

If ever there existed a case wherein the results
demanded a ruling to ameliorate a flaw in the fabric
of our jurisprudence, the case herein supplies just such
an opportunity.

Respectfully submitted

THOMAS A DUFFIN AND
GARY HOWE
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